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The representative-agent Lucas model stresses aggregate risk and hence does not allow us to study
the impact of agents’ heterogeneity on the dynamics of equilibrium trading volume. In this paper, we
investigate under what conditions non-informational heterogeneity, i.e., differences in preferences
and endowments, leads to nontrivial trading volume in equilibrium. We present a non-informational
no-trade theorem that provides necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for zero equilibrium trading
volume in a continuous-time Lucas market model with heterogeneous agents, multiple goods, and
multiple securities. We explain in detail how no-trade equilibria are related to autarky equilibria,
portfolio autarky equilibria, and peculiar ﬁnancial market equilibria, which play an important role in
the literature on international risk sharing.
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The main focus of the representative-agent Lucas model (Lucas, 1978) is on equilibrium
prices and returns. Agents in this model are identical by assumption. As a consequence, the
equilibrium sharing rule is linear and can be implemented without trade in ﬁnancial
securities. The representative-agent Lucas model is therefore valuable as a tool to study
aggregate market risk, but at the same time, does not provide any testable hypotheses for
equilibrium trading volume.
In order to generate nontrivial trading volume in a Lucas-type model, one needs to
model heterogeneity among agents. Heterogeneity can be introduced in terms of either
information,1 preferences or endowments. While it is well understood that in symmetric
information models the degree of heterogeneity of endowments, preferences, and beliefs
determines the equilibrium trading volume, necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for trade in
a dynamic model are still unavailable. The main result of this paper ﬁlls this gap. It comes
in the form of a no-trade theorem that provides necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for zero
trading volume in a Pareto-efﬁcient Lucas economy with multiple goods, multiple
securities, symmetric information, and homogeneous beliefs. We illustrate this result in a
number of examples that include most of the classical multi-good utility functions used in
ﬁnancial economics. These examples show that the existence of a no-trade equilibrium
does not necessarily require that agents have identical preferences. In particular, we show
that such an equilibrium can exist when agents have log-linear preferences but assign
different weights to each good in their consumption bundle.
As shown by Cass and Pavlova (2004) in a continuous-time model with multiple stocks,
markets are not necessarily complete in equilibrium even if the number of risky securities
equals the number of sources of risk. In order to circumvent the difﬁculties arising in the
study of inefﬁcient equilibria, we restrict our attention to Pareto-efﬁcient equilibria and use
the resulting proportionality of the utility gradients to infer the characteristics of
preferences and endowments that do not generate trade in equilibrium. In contrast, in
ﬁnite dimensional models, it is possible to choose the aggregate dividend in such a way that
markets are necessarily dynamically complete in equilibrium. Such a model is studied in
Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders (2003), where the aggregate dividends are given as an
irreducible, stationary Markov chain. They show that in this case, the optimal
consumption policies inherit the time homogeneity of the aggregate dividend, and they
conclude that no trading occurs after the initial period in equilibrium irrespective of the
agents’ preferences. This is a striking result, but one should bear in mind that stationarity
and irreducibility are strong assumptions. In particular, they imply that all information
about future dividends is revealed at the initial time and prevent the introduction of
dividend growth into the model. Furthermore, Bossaerts and Zame (2005) show that the
no-trade result of Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders (2003) fails to hold as soon as individual
endowments are nonstationary, even if stationarity is preserved at the aggregate level. Our
study complements this discussion by allowing for general arbitrarily growing dividend1See Pﬂeiderer (1984), Kyle (1985), Foster and Viswanathan (1990), and Wang (1994) for examples of models
with asymmetric information. Note that to overcome the informational no-trade theorems of Milgrom and Stokey
(1982) and Holmstro¨m and Myerson (1983), these models have to introduce exogenous liquidity traders or
stochastic supply shocks.
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becomes impossible to assume market completeness a priori.
A natural context in which our results can be applied is that of international ﬁnance,
where each agent is interpreted as being representative of a country and the relative prices
of goods represent the terms of trade. A very active area of research in this ﬁeld is the
analysis of international capital ﬂows. In particular, Souriounis (2003) and Hau and Rey
(2005) show that equity returns and portfolio rebalancings are an important source of
exchange rate dynamics. Given these empirical ﬁndings, it is surprising that many
of the theoretical asset pricing models in the international ﬁnance literature2 consider
preference speciﬁcations which satisfy the conditions of our theorem and thus fail to
produce realistic international capital ﬂows. Our result describes the structure of
preferences for which a no-trade equilibrium prevails, and thus characterizes the minimal
level of preference heterogeneity required to generate nontrivial portfolio rebalancings in
equilibrium.
The no-trade equilibria introduced in this paper are related to autarky and portfolio
autarky equilibria which are prominently featured in international ﬁnancial economics.
A no-trade equilibrium is an autarky equilibrium if initial endowments are individually
optimal. Lucas (1982) uses such equilibria to study interest rates and currency prices in a
general preference setting. He derives a perfectly pooled equilibrium assuming that
investors have identical preferences and symmetric endowments. It follows from our main
result and examples that such perfect pooling is not necessary: autarky equilibria are not
necessarily symmetric and can exist even if agents are not identical.
In a multi-good Lucas model, intertemporal risk sharing occurs through two
channels. First, as in a single-good economy, agents can trade Arrow-Debreu securities
synthesized from risky assets to ﬁnance their consumption plans. At the same time, relative
price movements and the possibility of trade in the spot market for goods provide
additional means for consumption smoothing. The importance of this second channel for
international trade has been stressed by Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Zapatero (1995), Serrat
(2001), and Pavlova and Rigobon (2003). In particular, Cole and Obstfeld study the
welfare gains associated with the existence of international ﬁnancial markets and show that
for identical Cobb–Douglas preferences, there exists a Pareto-efﬁcient equilibrium for
which optimal consumption plans can be ﬁnanced without trades in ﬁnancial assets. Such
an equilibrium is referred to as a portfolio autarky equilibrium. Interestingly, and as
demonstrated by our examples, for this class of preferences there exists a no-trade
equilibrium which yields the same consumption allocation and prices. It turns out that, in
general, the consumption allocation of an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium can be
implemented with portfolio autarky if and only if all investors have unit elasticity of
substitution. This condition is necessary and sufﬁcient provided that the no-trade
equilibrium is not already an autarky equilibrium which by deﬁnition is also a portfolio
autarky equilibrium. If the same allocation can be achieved either by trading once
in the ﬁnancial markets and never after that, or by trading continuously in the goods
market, ﬁnancial markets are redundant and agents are indifferent with respect to their
portfolio holdings. We formalize this intuition by showing that when efﬁcient no-trade2Cole and Obstfeld (1991), Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), Zapatero (1995), Baxter and Crucini (1995),
Arvanitis and Mikkola (1996), Baxter and Jermann (1997), Kehoe and Perri (2002), and Heathcote and Perri
(2002).
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sarily peculiar in the sense that all but one of the risky assets are redundant. Cass
and Pavlova (2004) introduce peculiar equilibria and prove their existence in a model
with log-linear preferences. Our results show that the property of logarithmic pre-
ferences which implies the existence of peculiar ﬁnancial market equilibria is their unit
elasticity of substitution. This property implies that the terms of trade are inversely
proportional to the ratio of aggregate dividends, and thus stock prices are linearly
dependent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our multi-good
economy and deﬁnes the different types of equilibria to be studied in the paper. Section 3
presents some simplifying notation and preliminary results. Section 4 contains our main
result and shows its application in a number of examples prominently featured in
international asset pricing. Section 5 discusses the economic relevance of no-trade
equilibria and their relation to linear sharing rules, fund separation, and international risk
sharing. Section 6 shows that no-trade equilibria are non-robust with regard to extensions
of the basic model that introduce heterogeneous beliefs and random endowments. Proofs
of all results are provided in the Appendix.2. The economy
We consider a continuous-time, stochastic economy on the ﬁnite time interval ½0;T 
modeled as follows.2.1. Information structure
The uncertainty is represented by a ﬁltered probability space ðO;F;F;PÞ on which is
deﬁned an n-dimensional Brownian motion B. The ﬁltration F is the usual augmentation of
the ﬁltration generated by the Brownian motion and we letF ¼FT so that the true state
of nature is completely determined by the paths of the Brownian motion up to the terminal
date of the model. All agents are endowed with the same information structure represented
by F and the same beliefs represented by the probability measure P.
All random processes to appear in the sequel are assumed to be progressively
measurable with respect to the ﬁltration F, and all statements involving random quantities
are understood to hold either almost surely or almost everywhere depending on the
context.2.2. Consumption space and goods markets
There is a ﬁnite number of perishable consumption goods indexed by a 2A for some
ﬁnite setA with A:¼cardðAÞ. The consumption space C is given by the set of nonnegative
and integrable consumption rate processes.
Each of the A available consumption goods can be traded in a perfect spot market. We
denote by p the A-dimensional vector process of relative prices of consumption goods. The
ﬁrst consumption good is assumed to serve as nume´raire and therefore its relative price is
normalized to one, i.e., p1t ¼ 1.
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The ﬁnancial market consists of a riskless savings account in zero net supply and n risky
stocks in positive net supply. Each stock represents a claim to an exogenously speciﬁed
stream of dividends denominated in one of the A available consumption goods. More
precisely, we assume that for each consumption good a 2A there is a number na, with
n :¼
X
a2A
napn, (1)
of traded securities whose dividends are paid in consumption good a. The column vector of
dividend rate processes associated with these securities is denoted by Da and is assumed to
be a nonnegative Itoˆ process of the form
Dat ¼ Da0 þ
Z t
0
ðras dsþ Was dBsÞ (2)
for some vector-valued drift ra and matrix-valued volatility Wa. In what follows, we denote
by D the n-dimensional column vector obtained by stacking up the good-speciﬁc dividend
vectors ðDaÞa2A and assume that its volatility matrix W has full row rank. This assumption
appears natural given that the focus of this paper is to identify necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for the existence of no-trade equilibria. Indeed, it allows us to exclude the non-
generic cases where a no-trade equilibrium exists simply because the dividends are designed
to pay exactly the agents’ optimal consumption plans.
The initial value of the savings account is normalized to one and we assume that in
equilibrium its price process is given by
S0t ¼ exp
Z t
0
rs ds
 
(3)
for some instantaneous interest rate process r such that the above integral is well deﬁned.
For each consumption good a 2A, we denote by Sa the vector of prices of the stocks
whose dividends are paid in good a and assume that
Sat þ
Z t
0
pasD
a
s ds ¼ Sa0 þ
Z t
0
ðmas dsþ sas dBsÞ (4)
for some vector-valued drift ma and matrix-valued volatility sa such that the above
integrals are well deﬁned. The security price coefﬁcients ðr; fsa; magÞ, or equivalently the
security price processes ðS0; fSagÞ, as well as the vector p of relative goods prices, are to be
determined endogenously in equilibrium.
2.4. Trading strategies
Trading takes place continuously and there are no frictions such as transaction costs or
taxes. Given the security prices, a trading strategy is a collection of share holdings
y :¼ðy0; fya : a 2AgÞ, (5)
where y0 represents the number of shares of the savings account held in the portfolio and,
for each consumption good a 2A, the vector process ya represents the number of shares
held in the portfolio of each of the stocks paying dividends in good a. A trading strategy y
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Wt :¼y0t S0t þ
X
a2A
ðyat Þ>Sat , (6)
is uniformly bounded from below by a constant. In what follows, we denote byY the set of
all admissible trading strategies. The requirement that the wealth process of an admissible
trading strategy be bounded from below is standard in the literature. It rules out the
possibility of doubling strategies and thus implies that the set Y is free of arbitrage
opportunities, see Dybvig and Huang (1988).
2.5. Preferences and endowments
The economy is populated by two price-taking agents indexed by i 2 f1; 2g. The
preferences of agent i over consumption plans in C are represented by a time-additive
expected utility functional
UiðcÞ :¼E
Z T
0
uiðt; ctÞds
 
. (7)
Throughout the paper we assume that the utility function ui satisﬁes textbook regularity,
monotonicity, and concavity assumptions as well as a multi-good version of the Inada
conditions. In order to guarantee that certain expectations can be differentiated under the
integral sign, we further assume that the utility function satisﬁes a rather weak technical
condition which is stated and discussed in the Appendix. We note for later use that, as a
result of the above assumptions, the utility gradient rui is a one-to-one mapping and hence
admits an inverse function which we denote by f i.
Agent i is initially endowed with a portfolio consisting of naki X0 shares of each of the
available stocks, where naki refers to the kth stock paying dividends in good a. We assume,
without loss of generality, that the agents’ initial portfolios verify the identity
nak1 þ nak2 ¼ 1; ða; kÞ 2A f1; . . . ; nag (8)
so that the net supply of each of the stocks is normalized to one unit. For further reference
we also denote by nai the vector of the number of shares of stocks paying dividends in good
a in the initial portfolio of agent i. As observed by Cass and Pavlova (2004), agent i’s
endowment maybe negative in some stocks as long as the initial market value of the
portfolio is nonnegative. Given that our prime interest is to establish the existence of no-
trade equilibria, we restrict our analysis to nonnegative endowments.
2.6. Feasible consumption plans
A consumption plan c 2 C is said to be feasible for agent i if there exists an admissible
trading strategy y 2 Y whose associated wealth process satisﬁes agent i’s dynamic budget
constraint
W 0 ¼ y00 þ
X
a2A
ðya0Þ>Sa0 ¼Wi0 :¼
X
a2A
ðnai Þ>Sa0, (9)
dWt ¼ y0t dS0t þ
X
a2A
ððyat Þ>ðdSat þ pat Dat dtÞ  pat cat dtÞ (10)
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consumption plans for agent i. Note that this set is not empty as agent i is initially endowed
with a long position in each of the stocks.
2.7. Definitions of equilibrium
In what follows we denote by E :¼ððO;F;F;PÞ; fui; nai g; fDagÞ the primitives for the above
continuous-time economy. Our concept of equilibrium is similar to that of the equilibrium
of plans, prices, and expectations introduced by Radner (1972) and is deﬁned in the
following:
Deﬁnition 1 (Financial market equilibrium). An equilibrium for the continuous-time
economy E is a set of security prices ðS0; fSagÞ, a relative price process p, and a set of
consumption plans and admissible trading strategies fci; yig such that:1.3
DiThe consumption plan ci maximizes Ui over the feasible set Ci and is ﬁnanced by the
admissible trading strategy yi 2 Y.2. The securities and goods markets clear in the sense that
y01t þ y02t ¼ 0, (11)
ya1t þ ya2t ¼ 1a; and (12)
ca1t þ ca2t ¼ 1>a Dat (13)
hold for all a 2A and t 2 ½0;T  where 1a denotes an na-dimensional column vector of
ones.
In our model the dividend processes of the traded securities are linearly independent
since their volatility matrix has full rank. However, because there are fewer traded
securities than there are Brownian motions, the equilibria for the economy E have
incomplete ﬁnancial markets in general. Furthermore, and as demonstrated by Cass and
Pavlova (2004), the equilibrium may very well have incomplete ﬁnancial markets even if
there are as many traded securities as there are Brownian motions. Given this observation,
and in order to facilitate our study, we further restrict ourselves to equilibria that are
efﬁcient in the sense that they yield Pareto-optimal allocations given the asset structure.3
While the full set of equilibria is in general very hard to characterize (see, e.g., Cuoco and
He, 1994), that of efﬁcient equilibria is more easily analyzed. Indeed, by the Pareto
optimality of equilibrium allocations, there exists a strictly positive constant l such that
ru1ðt; c1tÞ ¼ lru2ðt; c2tÞ, (14)
where rui denotes the gradient of agent i’s utility function. Along with the goods market-
clearing condition, the above restriction implies that the individual consumption
allocations solve the maximization problem
uðt; l; dtÞ :¼ max
c1þc2¼dt
fu1ðt; c1Þ þ lu2ðt; c2Þg, (15)In static models this notion is also referred to as constrained Pareto optimality or Pareto optimality in the
amond sense (see Diamond, 1967; or Magill and Quinzii, 1996).
ARTICLE IN PRESS
T. Berrada et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 83 (2007) 719–750726where the process d ¼ ðdaÞ with dat :¼1>a Dat denotes the vector of good-speciﬁc ag-
gregate dividends. As a result, every efﬁcient equilibrium can be supported by a
representative agent endowed with the aggregate supply of securities and with utility
function uðt; l; Þ even though the resulting ﬁnancial markets might be incomplete. In order
to facilitate the presentation of our main results, we brieﬂy review this characterization in
the next section.
Our main objective is to present necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of
an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium. Therefore, we next deﬁne the notion of no-trade
equilibrium that we shall be using throughout the paper.
Deﬁnition 2 (No-trade equilibrium). An equilibrium for the economy E is a no-trade
equilibrium if it satisﬁes the following three assertions:1.4
imp
goo
of t
giv
com
ShaPortfolio shares of risky assets are constant over time: yait ¼ yai0.
2. Agents do not hold the riskless asset: y0i0 ¼ y0it ¼ 0.
3. There is no activity in the spot market for goods: cait ¼ ðyai0Þ>Dat .In a no-trade equilibrium, trading volume is zero after the initial period in any
of the ﬁnancial assets. Furthermore, there is no activity in the spot markets in the sense
that the optimal consumption plans coincide with the dividend payments that the agents
receive from their portfolios. As the dividends in each good vary stochastically over time,
optimal consumption varies as well. But in contrast to the equilibria in Deﬁnition 1, the
resulting ﬂuctuations in consumption are not smoothed by trades in either of the open
markets.
In the context of a multi-country Lucas model, where our results most naturally apply, a
no-trade equilibrium does not guarantee the absence of geographical trade. Indeed, if the
domestic agent holds a fraction of a foreign asset, the dividend paid in a foreign good must
be shipped to the domestic country for consumption.4 We further discuss the implications
of our results for international ﬁnance models in Section 5.4.
3. Preliminary results
3.1. A useful notation
In order to simplify the presentation of our results, we now introduce a vector
notation which will be used repeatedly in what follows. For an arbitrary collection
ðxaÞa2A of vectors with xa 2 Rna , we use the shorthand notation FðxaÞ to denote theBasak and Croitoru (2004) have recently shown that this kind of ﬁnancial shipping can relieve market
erfections causing segmentations of good markets, as it substitutes for physical shipping of consumption
ds. It is important to note that the substitutability of physical and ﬁnancial shipping is an idiosyncratic feature
he Lucas tree model. As emphasized by Cass and Pavlova (2004), initial endowments in Lucas tree models are
en in terms of property rights on the dividend streams risky assets pay in the future and not in terms of
modities as in the benchmark real asset model from ﬁnancial equilibrium theory, introduced by Magill and
fer (1990).
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FðxaÞ :¼
x1 0       0
0    0 x2    0
..
. ..
. ..
. ..
.
..
. ..
.
0    0
0    0    xA
2
66666664
3
77777775
2 RAn. (16)
The linear operator F enables us to transform a collection of good-speciﬁc vectors into a
matrix. This simpliﬁes the notation in consumption and portfolio computations. In
particular, the vector of good-speciﬁc aggregate dividend processes is given by dt ¼ IDt
where I :¼Fð1aÞ.
3.2. Individual optimality
Let the security and goods prices be given and assume that there are no arbitrage
opportunities, for otherwise the market could not be in equilibrium. As is well known (see,
e.g., Karatzas and Shreve, 1998), this assumption implies that there exists an n-dimensional
process k, which is referred to as a relative risk premium, such that
mat  rtSat ¼ sat kt; a 2A. (17)
Let K denote the set of relative risk premiums, and for every such process consider the
nonnegative process deﬁned by
xkt :¼ exp 
Z t
0
rs ds
Z t
0
k>s dBs 
1
2
Z t
0
kksk2 ds
 
. (18)
The following proposition shows that the set S :¼fxk : k 2Kg coincides with the set of
arbitrage-free state price densities and provides a convenient necessary and sufﬁcient
condition for the optimality of a given consumption plan.
Proposition 1. If security and goods prices are given, then the following assertions hold:1. A consumption plan is feasible for agent i if and only if it satisfies the static budget
constraint
E
Z T
0
xkt p
>
t ct dt
 
pWi0 (19)
for all market price of risk processes k 2K where the initial wealth Wi0 is defined as in
Eq. (9).2. A feasible consumption plan is optimal for agent i if and only if
ct ¼ f iðt; yiptxkit Þ (20)
for some strictly positive constant yi and some process ki 2K such that Eq. (19) holds as
an equality.
The results of the proposition can be summarized as follows. The ﬁrst part shows that a
consumption plan is feasible if and only if it satisﬁes a static budget constraint with respect
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consumption plan is optimal if and only if its marginal utility deﬁnes an arbitrage-free state
price density process for which the static budget is saturated.3.3. A characterization of efficient equilibria
Assume that there exists an efﬁcient equilibrium for the economy E, denote by fcig the
corresponding consumption allocations, and let the representative-agent utility function be
deﬁned as in (15).
Since consuming the good-speciﬁc aggregate dividends must be optimal for the
representative agent, it follows from the second part of Proposition 1 that the process of
marginal rates of substitution
ptxt :¼
ruðt; l; dtÞ
r1uð0; l; d0Þ
¼ ruiðt; citÞr1uið0; ci0Þ
(21)
identiﬁes the vector of good-speciﬁc equilibrium state prices. Moreover, Pareto optimality
implies that the consumption allocations solve the representative agent’s optimization
problem and it follows that
c1t :¼f 1ðt;ruðt; l; dtÞÞ; c2t :¼dt  c1t ¼ f 2ðt;ruðt; l; dtÞ=lÞ, (22)
where f iðt; Þ denotes the inverse of agent i’s gradient mapping. On the other hand, the
deﬁnition of the set of state price densities and the absence of arbitrage opportunities imply
that the process
Nat :¼xtSat þ
Z t
0
xsp
a
sD
a
s ds (23)
is a martingale under the objective probability measure.5 It follows that in any efﬁcient
equilibrium the security prices satisfy
Sat ¼ E
Z T
t
xspasD
a
s ds
xt
Ft
 
; a 2A, (24)
where the good-speciﬁc state price pax is deﬁned as in (21) for some strictly positive l such
that the ﬁrst agent’s budget constraint holds as an equality.
As the ﬁnancial market is in general incomplete, it is very difﬁcult to check directly that
Eq. (22) deﬁnes a pair of feasible consumption plans given the security prices in Eq. (24).
As a result, the above characterization cannot be used to construct an efﬁcient equilibrium
unless we can verify a priori that Eq. (24) deﬁnes a complete ﬁnancial market. However, if
we restrict our attention to efﬁcient equilibria that have no trade, then the situation
becomes much simpler. Indeed, for such equilibria the consumption plans in Eq. (22) are
linear functions of the dividends and are thus feasible by construction. In the next section,
we use this argument to obtain sufﬁcient conditions on the primitives of the economy for
the existence of an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium.5Strictly speaking, the absence of arbitrage opportunities and the deﬁnition ofS only imply that the process Na
is a local martingale. The technical argument required to show that this process is a real martingale is provided in
the Appendix after the proof of Proposition 1.
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4.1. The no-trade theorem
We now turn to this paper’s main topic and investigate conditions under which an
efﬁcient equilibrium generates trade. While it is well understood that heterogeneity among
agents should generate trade in both goods and ﬁnancial markets, necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for trade in a dynamic model are lacking. Our main result ﬁlls this gap and
comes in the form of a no-trade theorem.
Theorem 1. The following assertions are equivalent:1. There exists an efficient no-trade equilibrium.
2. There exists an efficient equilibrium in which the individual consumption allocation
satisfies
cait
cai0
¼ 1
>
a D
a
t
1>a D
a
0
¼ d
a
t
da0
; ða; t; iÞ 2A ½0;T   f1; 2g, (25)
where dat denotes the aggregate output of good a 2A at time t 2 ½0;T .
3. There exists a diagonal matrix w with strictly positive, constant diagonal elements wa 2
ð0; 1Þ such that
ru1ðt;wdtÞ
r1u1ð0;wd0Þ
¼ ru2ðt; dt  wdtÞr1u2ð0; d0  wd0Þ
; t 2 ½0;T  (26)
and
E
Z T
0
ru1ðt;wdtÞ>ðwI Fðna1ÞÞDt dt
 
¼ 0, (27)
where I is the rectangular matrix defined in Section 3.1 and d ¼ ID denotes the vector of
good-specific aggregate dividends.The results of the above theorem can be summarized as follows. Assertion 2 shows that
in an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium, the consumption policies of each of the agents must
exhibit the same growth rate as the corresponding good-speciﬁc aggregate output and that,
given the existence of an efﬁcient equilibrium, this property is also sufﬁcient for the
existence of a no-trade equilibrium. The third assertion states that a no-trade equilibrium
exists if and only if the utility gradients of the agents can be aligned along a linear sharing
rule that satisﬁes either of the static budget constraints. This third assertion is the most
important from a practical point of view, as it provides necessary and sufﬁcient conditions
for the existence of an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium in terms of the model primitives. In
the next section we review most of the classic forms of multi-good utility functions and use
the third assertion to determine the minimal level of heterogeneity needed to generate
nontrivial trading volume.
The conclusions of Theorem 1 share some close connections with classical results on
linear sharing rules and fund separation. These connections, as well as the implications of
Theorem 1 for international ﬁnance models, are discussed in Section 5.
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In this section, we illustrate the implications of Theorem 1 for some common classes of
utility functions. For simplicity of exposition we assume throughout this section that there
are only two consumption goods ðA ¼ 2Þ and that there is only one security paying out in
each of the two available consumption goods ðn1 ¼ n2 ¼ 1Þ.
4.2.1. Constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
As a ﬁrst example, we consider the class of CES utility functions. Agents’ utility
functions display constant elasticity of substitution if they take the parametric form
uiðt; cÞ :¼ekt½ai1ðc1Þri þ ai2ðc2Þri gi=ri , (28)
where k is a nonnegative constant subjective discount rate which we assume to be equal
across agents. The preference parameters, ri 2 ð0; 1Þ, gio1, and aia40, are ﬁxed constants.
As is easily seen, such preferences have constant relative risk aversion gi and constant
elasticity of substitution 1=ð1 riÞ determined by the parameter ri.
Using the equivalent assertions of Theorem 1 we now show that, given such preferences,
an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium exists if and only if the agents have cardinally identical
preferences orderings.
Corollary 1. Assume that agents have constant elasticity of substitution utility functions (28).
Then an efficient no-trade equilibrium exists if and only if r1 ¼ r2, g1 ¼ g2 and a11a12 ¼
a21
a22
.
Next, we consider two classes of preferences for which a closed form characterization of
an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium can be obtained for general dynamics of dividends.
4.2.2. Nonseparable Cobb–Douglas preferences
Agents have nonseparable Cobb–Douglas preferences if their utility functions take the
parametric form
uiðt; cÞ :¼ektaiðc1Þai1ðc2Þai2 , (29)
where k is a nonnegative constant subjective discount rate which we assume equal across
agents, ai is a positive constant, and aia 2 ð0; 1Þ are constants such that ai1 þ ai2o1. Note
that this parametric form is the limit of the constant elasticity of substitution speciﬁcation
as the coefﬁcient ri goes to zero. Thus, nonseparable Cobb–Douglas preferences are
homogeneous of degree ai1 þ ai2 and have unit elasticity of substitution.
Corollary 2. Assume that agents have nonseparable Cobb–Douglas preferences. Then an
efficient no-trade equilibrium exists if and only if a1a ¼ a2a. In this case, the equity holdings
and consumption shares of the first agent satisfy
ya1t ¼
ca1t
Dat
¼ w :¼ a11n
1
1 þ a12n21
a11 þ a12
; a 2A, (30)
where na1 2 ½0; 1 is the number of shares of the stock paying in good a in the initial portfolio of
the first agent.
Corollary 2 shows that a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of an
efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium is that all agents have equal preference weights for
consumption goods in the nonseparable Cobb–Douglas utility function. Even though
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efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium only exists if the weights for each good are the same. The
only heterogeneity allowed is given by the constant ai. As von Neumann–Morgenstern
preferences are unique up to afﬁne transformations, it follows that an efﬁcient no-trade
equilibrium with nonseparable Cobb–Douglas preferences exists if and only if agents have
cardinally identical preference orderings.
The results of Section 3.3 and Corollary 2 allow us to bring to light a striking property of
efﬁcient equilibria with nonseparable Cobb–Douglas preferences. Indeed, using Eq. (21)
we ﬁnd that in any such equilibrium the relative price is proportional to the ratio of
aggregate dividends and given by
p2t ¼
a12D1t
a11D2t
. (31)
This implies that the dividends of the two stocks are linearly dependent when expressed in
units of the nume´raire consumption good and it now follows from Eq. (24) that the
equilibrium stock prices satisfy
S2t ¼
a12
a11
S1t . (32)
As a consequence, the volatility matrix of the risky assets is singular and it follows
that, in any efﬁcient equilibrium, both stocks represent the same investment oppor-
tunity. This provides an intuitive explanation for the existence of a no-trade equili-
brium with cardinally equivalent Cobb–Douglas preferences. As the volatility matrix
of the risky assets is singular in any efﬁcient equilibrium, the trading strategies
that implement the equilibrium consumption allocation are not uniquely deﬁned. The
special form of the relative price process then implies that these strategies can be cho-
sen in such a way that there is no trade in the ﬁnancial markets after the initial period as
well as no activity in the goods markets and it follows that an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium
exists.
Cass and Pavlova (2004) show that if the agents have log-linear preferences, then the
stock prices will be linearly dependent in any efﬁcient equilibrium, and they label this
situation Peculiar Financial Equilibrium. The result of Corollary 2 and the above discussion
show that this type of equilibrium also occurs if the agents have identical Cobb–Douglas
utility functions.4.2.3. Log-linear preferences
Agents have log-linear preferences if their utility functions take the parametric form
uiðt; cÞ :¼ektðai1 logðc1Þ þ ai2 logðc2ÞÞ, (33)
where k is a nonnegative constant subjective discount rate which we assume equal across
agents and the aia are strictly positive, agent-speciﬁc constants. This speciﬁcation of
preferences is popular for its tractability and has been used in numerous studies including
Zapatero (1995) and Cass and Pavlova (2004).
Corollary 3. Assume that agents have log-linear preferences (33). Then an efficient no-trade
equilibrium exists for all ðaiaÞ 2 ð0;1Þ4. In this equilibrium the equity holdings and
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y11t ¼
c11t
D1t
¼ w1 :¼ a11ða21n
1
1 þ a22n21Þ
a12a21ð1 n21Þ þ a11ða21 þ a22n21Þ
, ð34Þ
y21t ¼
c21t
D2t
¼ w2 :¼ a12ða21n
1
1 þ a22n21Þ
a11a22ð1 n11Þ þ a12ða22 þ a21n11Þ
, ð35Þ
where nai 2 ½0; 1 is the number of shares of the stock paying in good a in agent i’s initial
portfolio.
As in the previous example, we can recover the relative price and stock prices from the
results of Section 3.3. Indeed, Eq. (21) identiﬁes the vector of good-speciﬁc state prices as
ptxt ¼
ruiðt; citÞ
r1uið0; ci0Þ
¼ ekt D
1
0
D1t
;
a12w1D1t
a11w2D2t
" #>
(36)
and plugging this back into the pricing relations (24) shows that the equilibrium prices of
the risky securities satisfy
S1t ¼
1
k
ð1 ekðTtÞÞD1t ¼
a11w2
a12w1
S2t . (37)
With this particular form of utility function, the price of the ﬁrst stock is a linear function
of the ﬁrst dividend, and as the relative price of the second good is inversely proportional
to the ratio of dividends, the price of the second stock is also a linear function of the ﬁrst
dividend. It follows that the stock volatility matrix is degenerate and hence that the no-
trade equilibrium is a peculiar ﬁnancial equilibrium as was the case for identical
Cobb–Douglas preferences in the previous example.
While efﬁcient no-trade equilibria and peculiar ﬁnancial equilibria coincide for log-
linear and Cobb–Douglas preferences, it is important to note that this is not the case in
general. In Section 5.4 we establish that a sufﬁcient condition for an efﬁcient no-trade
equilibrium to be a peculiar ﬁnancial equilibrium is that agents have unit-elastic utility
functions. This condition is in turn equivalent to the fact that the relative price is
proportional to the ratio of dividends and we provide an example to show that if this
property fails the efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium need not be of the peculiar type.4.2.4. Separable Cobb–Douglas preferences
Agents have separable Cobb–Douglas preferences if their utility function takes the
parametric form
uiðt; cÞ :¼
X
a2A
ekt
1
aia
ðcaÞaia , (38)
where k is a nonnegative constant subjective discount rate which we assume equal across
agents and the aia 2 ð1; 1Þ are nonzero constants that determine the agent’s relative risk
aversion in each of the goods. Note that, contrary to the three other examples of this
section, separable Cobb–Douglas preferences have a non-constant elasticity of substitution
between goods.
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equilibrium exists if and only if the agents’ preferences exhibit the same relative risk
aversion for consumption in each of the two goods.
Corollary 4. Assume that agents have separable Cobb–Douglas preferences (38). Then an
efficient no-trade equilibrium exists if and only if a1a ¼ a2a for all a 2A.
In the absence of non-traded goods, this speciﬁcation of the utility functions is a special
case, with identical discount rates, of that employed in Serrat (2001). In his Section 3.2
Serrat claims that in the absence of non-traded goods agents follow buy-and-hold
strategies in equilibrium. Using the above results, we note that this claim is only valid
provided that the subjective discount rate is the same for the two agents.
5. The relevance of no-trade equilibria
In this section we discuss the link between the existence of no-trade equilibria and linear
risk tolerance, elasticities of substitution, fund separation, discrete-time stationary Markov
equilibria, and international asset pricing.
5.1. No-trade equilibria and linear sharing rules
Borch (1962), Wilson (1968), and Huang and Litzenberger (1985) have shown that a
necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the generic optimality of linear sharing rules in
single-good, static economies is that all agents have linear risk tolerance with identical
cautiousness parameters. Our results can be viewed as a generalization of theirs to the case
of dynamic economies with multiple consumption goods.
To see this, consider the single-good case with time-independent utility functions.
We start by observing that, since consumption must be positive at all times, market
clearing implies that any linear sharing rule must have a zero intercept in order to be
feasible. Thus, it follows from the second assertion of Theorem 1 that given the existence
of an efﬁcient equilibrium, the generic optimality of linear sharing rules is equivalent
to the generic existence of an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium. Using Assertion 3, this is in
turn equivalent to the fact that for any aggregate dividend process and any initial
allocation the budget constraint (27) holds, and in addition, there exists a constant w 2
ð0; 1Þ such that
t1ðwDÞ ¼ t2ðð1 wÞDÞ; D 2 ð0;1Þ, (39)
where ti denotes the relative risk tolerance of agent i. For these equations to admit a
solution in ð0; 1Þ regardless of the aggregate dividend and the initial allocations, it is
necessary and sufﬁcient that both agents have the same constant relative risk tolerance
parameter. We thus conclude that in a single-good, continuous-time economy a necessary
and sufﬁcient condition for the generic optimality of linear sharing rules is that both agents
have the same constant relative risk aversion utility function.
In the multi-good setting, the situation is less simple. The generic optimality of linear
sharing rules is still equivalent to the generic existence of an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium.
However, the latter property can no longer be characterized explicitly in terms of the
agents’ utility functions unless we assume that agents have separable utility functions of
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uiðt; cÞ ¼
X
a2A
ektuai ðcaÞ (40)
for some nonnegative subjective discount rate which is common to both agents. In this
case, it follows from the third assertion of Theorem 1 that the generic existence of an
efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium is equivalent to the generic existence of strictly positive
constants wao1 such that
ta1ðwaxÞ ¼ ta2ðð1 waÞxÞ; ðx; aÞ 2 ð0;1Þ A, (41)
and the budget constraint (27) holds where tai denotes the relative risk tolerance of agent i
for consumption in good a. For these equations to admit a solution for all aggregate
dividends and initial allocations, it is necessary and sufﬁcient that both agents have the
same constant relative risk tolerance parameter for consumption in each of the goods. We
thus conclude that in a multi-good, continuous-time economy with separable preferences, a
necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the generic optimality of linear sharing rules is that
agents have identical separable Cobb–Douglas preferences.5.2. No-trade equilibria and fund separation
In the single good case, it is well known from Hakanson (1967) and Cass and Stiglitz
(1970), that the optimality of linear sharing rules, and hence also the existence of an
efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium, is related to fund separation. In order to explore this
connection, assume ﬁrst that an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium exists. By the second
assertion of Theorem 1, this implies that the equilibrium sharing rule is linear and since
there is no activity in the goods market, it follows that the wealth of the agents are given by
W 1t ¼
X
a2A
waMat and W
2
t ¼
X
a2A
ð1 waÞMat (42)
for some strictly positive constants wa where the process Ma :¼1>a Sa denotes the value of
the market portfolio of assets which pay their dividends in good a. Thus, we conclude that
a sufﬁcient condition for A-fund separation to hold in a continuous-time economy with A
consumption goods is that there exists an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium.
If there is a single consumption good, then this condition is also necessary. To see this,
consider the single-good case and assume that one-fund separation holds so that each
agent holds a constant fraction of the market portfolio. This implies that there is no
trading on the ﬁnancial market and, since consumption cannot be smoothed by any other
means, it follows that the equilibrium sharing rule is linear. The second assertion of
Theorem 1 then implies that there exists a no-trade equilibrium and we conclude that one-
fund separation is necessary and sufﬁcient for the existence of an efﬁcient no-trade
equilibrium.
In the multi-good setting the situation is less simple and it is no longer possible to show
that the existence of an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium is necessary for A-fund separation to
hold. The reason for this impossibility is twofold. First, nothing guarantees that the mutual
funds correspond to static portfolios of the underlying risky assets. Second, even if the
mutual funds do correspond to buy-and-hold portfolios, this does not imply that the
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goods.5.3. No-trade equilibria in discrete time economies
A careful inspection of the proof of Theorem 1 reveals that the only place where the
assumptions of continuous time and Itoˆ process dynamics are used is in the proof of the
fact that Assertion 1 implies Assertion 2. It follows that, after suitable modiﬁcations of
the basic model, the conditions of Assertion 3 are still sufﬁcient for the existence of an
efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium in a discrete-time economy with multiple goods and ﬁnite or
inﬁnite horizon.
While sufﬁcient for the existence of an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium, Assertion 3 is far
from being necessary in a discrete-time economy with multiple goods. Indeed, it can easily
be shown that the conditions of Assertion 3 remain sufﬁcient if we replace (26) by the
weaker requirement that
ru1ðt;FðbaÞDtÞ ¼ lru2ðt; ðI FðbaÞÞDtÞ (43)
for some collection of nonnegative vectors ðbaÞa2A and some strictly positive constant l
which represents the weight of the second agent in the construction of the representative
agent’s utility function.
In a recent paper, Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders (2003) show that trading volume is
generically zero in a discrete-time, single-good economy populated by heterogeneous
agents. This seems to contradict our theorem. As they remark, however, their result relies
on the strong distributional assumption of a time-homogeneous stationary Markov chain
for the aggregate dividend. In that case, equilibrium consumption allocations inherit the
time-homogeneity properties of the dividend process and it follows that there always exists
a solution to Eq. (43) irrespective of the choice of the utility functions. To illustrate this let
us consider a single good economy with N states of the world and N stocks paying linearly
independent dividends modeled as a time homogeneous stationary Markov chain. The
ﬁnancial market in this discrete-time economy does not include a locally riskless savings
account; to replace it we assume, as in Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders (2003), that one of
the risky assets is a ﬁxed-income security such as a coupon bond. In such a model, Eq. (43)
may be rewritten as
u01ðt;b>DnÞ ¼ lu02ðt; ð1 bÞ>DnÞ; n 2 f1; . . . ;Ng, (44)
for some b 2 ½0; 1N and some strictly positive constant l where Dn denotes the vector of
dividends of the risky assets in state n. When utility functions are time separable and
discount rates are identical across agents, as in Judd, Kubler, and Schmedders (2003), this
system may be rewritten without the time dependency as
u01ðb>DnÞ ¼ lu02ðð1 bÞ>DnÞ; n 2 f1; ; . . . ;Ng. (45)
The linear independence of the dividends and the fact that the marginal utilities are strictly
decreasing imply that, for each strictly positive l, this system admits a unique solution bðlÞ
with bð1Þ ¼ 0 and bð0Þ ¼ 1. As a result, the constant l can be chosen in such a way that
the budget constraint (27) holds and it follows that an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium can be
constructed irrespective of the choice of the agents’ utility functions.
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A natural context in which to apply our general results is that of international ﬁnance,
where each agent is interpreted as being representative of a country and the relative prices
of goods deﬁne the terms of trade.
Examples of studies which analyze the properties of international equilibria include
Lucas (1982), Cole and Obstfeld (1991), and Zapatero (1995), who all use models with two
countries, two consumption goods, one risky asset in each country, and time-separable
utility functions of the form
uiðt; cÞ ¼ ektviðcÞ (46)
for some nonnegative subjective discount rate k which is assumed to be equal across
agents.6 In order to facilitate comparison we use a similar setting throughout this section.
In our notation, such a model corresponds to A ¼ 2, n1 ¼ n2 ¼ 1 and hence coincides with
the two-good model underlying the examples of the previous section.
In order to connect the results of this paper to those of the international ﬁnance
literature, we start by deﬁning two concepts of equilibrium that are commonly used in that
literature.
Deﬁnition 3 (Autarky equilibrium). An autarky equilibrium for E is an equilibrium with no
activity in goods markets and ﬁnancial markets, that is, a no-trade equilibrium with yait ¼
nai for all ða; t; iÞ 2A ½0;T   f1; 2g.
In a classic paper, Lucas (1982) shows that an efﬁcient autarky equilibrium exists for the
model of this section if both investors are identical in terms of preferences and
endowments. The intuition for this result is straightforward: because agents are identical,
each of them consumes half of the aggregate output in the two goods and no trade on
either of the open markets is necessary as the initial portfolios of the agents produce
exactly the equilibrium allocation.
The results of Theorem 1 show that efﬁcient autarky equilibria can exist even if the
agents are not identical in preferences and endowments. Indeed, it easily follows from the
third assertion of Theorem 1 that if a no-trade equilibrium exists for a given preference
structure, then an autarky equilibrium can be constructed by deﬁning na1 ¼ wa to be the
initial endowment of the ﬁrst agent. As illustrated in the ﬁrst example of the previous
section, this requires neither v1 ¼ v2 nor that the agents be endowed with half of the risky
assets.
Deﬁnition 4 (Portfolio autarky equilibrium). A portfolio autarky equilibrium is an
equilibrium in which there is no activity in the ﬁnancial markets: agents hold on to their
initial stock allocations and optimal consumptions are attained by trading only in the spot
market for goods.
In contrast to a no-trade equilibrium where there is no activity in the goods markets and
where dividend payments from equity holdings ﬁnance the optimal consumption plans, in6More sophisticated models have been studied by, among others, Serrat (2001), who uses a two-country model
with two traded goods and two non-traded goods; Pavlova and Rigobon (2003), who analyze a two-country
model with log-linear utilities and agent-speciﬁc stochastic discount rates; and Pavlova and Rigobon (2005), who
consider a similar model with three countries, three goods, three risky assets, and portfolio constraints.
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consumption. As can be seen from the deﬁnition, an efﬁcient autarky equilibrium is an
efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium since it entails no trading in either of the open markets. On
the other hand, the concept of no-trade equilibrium introduced in this paper is very
different from that of portfolio autarky since it requires that there be no activity on the
spot market for goods.
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) study the welfare gains from international risk sharing by
analyzing conditions under which a portfolio autarky equilibrium is efﬁcient. They start
from an economy where agents are restricted to hold their domestic ﬁnancial assets but can
trade on the goods market. They show that if the agents have identical Cobb–Douglas
utility then there exists an efﬁcient portfolio autarky equilibrium. In other words, for some
speciﬁc preference structure, international ﬁnancial markets do not improve welfare in
their model. They show, however, that simple perturbations such as non-tradable goods
restore the need for international ﬁnancial markets in reaching an efﬁcient allocation.
Surprisingly, and as can be seen from Corollary 2, for this preference structure an efﬁcient
no-trade equilibrium also exists and yields the same consumption allocation. In order to
reconcile these ﬁndings, one needs to think in terms of the risk spanned by the domestic
and foreign ﬁnancial markets. If the same allocation can be achieved either by trading once
in the ﬁnancial markets and never after that, or by trading continuously in the goods
market, this suggest that ﬁnancial markets are somewhat redundant and that agents are
indifferent with respect to their portfolios. In other words, we expect that in this situation
the domestic and foreign ﬁnancial markets represent identical investment opportunities
and thus that the equilibrium is peculiar in the sense of Cass and Pavlova (2004). The
following result formalizes this intuition and clariﬁes the relations between no-trade and
portfolio autarky equilibria.
Proposition 2. Assume that an efficient no-trade equilibrium exists. Then its consumption
allocation can be implemented in portfolio autarky if and only if one of the following
conditions holds:1. It is an autarky equilibrium.
2. Agents have utility functions with unit elasticity of substitution.In the latter case, one of the two stocks is redundant and it follows that the equilibrium is
peculiar in the sense of Cass and Pavlova (2004).
The conclusions of the above proposition are twofold. First, it shows that an efﬁcient
no-trade equilibrium that is not an autarky equilibrium can be implemented in portfolio
autarky if and only if both agents have unit elasticity of substitution. In particular, and as
illustrated in the ﬁrst and last examples of Section 4.2, the economy can admit an efﬁcient
no-trade equilibrium even if it does not admit an efﬁcient portfolio autarky equilibrium.
Second, it shows that whenever the two types of equilibrium coexist for a given
economy, then the equilibrium is necessarily peculiar in the sense that one of the stocks is
redundant. Interestingly, most of the tractable international models in the literature
assume unit-elastic preferences and admit an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium. For example,
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) consider the case of identical nonseparable Cobb–Douglas utility
functions and Zapatero (1995) assumes log-linear preferences. Such models do not provide
a role for international ﬁnancial markets since the domestic and foreign assets span the
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except to demonstrate the existence of efﬁcient portfolio autarky equilibria.
Different approaches have been proposed to circumvent this difﬁculty while maintaining
tractability. For example, Pavlova and Rigobon (2003) introduce individual speciﬁc
preference shocks in an equilibrium model with log-linear preferences; and Cole and
Obstfeld (1991) suggest introducing country speciﬁc non-traded goods while maintaining
the assumptions of Cobb–Douglas utility for the traded goods.7 Another way to maintain
tractability while relaxing the conditions of Proposition 2 is to use the concept of no-trade
equilibrium. Indeed, since no-trade equilibria can exist without the restriction of unit
elasticity of substitution, Theorem 1 makes it possible to build tractable international
equilibrium models where the ﬁnancial markets are not perfectly correlated. In order to
construct an example of such a model, consider the case where the two agents have
identical utility functions of the form
viðcÞ ¼
X
a2A
1
aa
ðcaÞaa (47)
for some nonzero constants aao1 and assume that the dividend processes of the two risky
securities are independent Markov processes. As the agents have identical separable
Cobb–Douglas utility functions, it follows from Corollary 3 that an efﬁcient no-trade
equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, the optimal consumption of the ﬁrst agent is given
by c1t ¼ wDt for some diagonal matrix w with coordinates in ð0; 1Þ and it follows that
p2t ¼
ðw2D2t Þa21
ðw1D2t Þa11
(48)
identiﬁes the relative price process. In particular, the corresponding allocation cannot be
implemented in portfolio autarky since none of the conditions in Proposition 2 are
satisﬁed. In order to show that this equilibrium does not have perfectly correlated ﬁnancial
markets, let us now turn to the stock prices. Given that the utility function is separable in
the two goods and the dividends are Markov, the price of stock one does not involve the
relative price process and is thus a function
S1t ¼ jðt;D1t Þ (49)
of time and the ﬁrst dividend process. On the other hand, the price of the second stock
involves the relative price process and is thus a function
S2t :¼cðt;D1t ;D2t Þ (50)
of time and the two dividend processes. Under our assumptions, this implies that the
volatility matrix of the stock price process is invertible and hence that international
ﬁnancial markets are not perfectly correlated.
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) numerically assess the importance of international ﬁnancial
markets for risk sharing by calculating the welfare loss induced by forcing portfolio
autarky when agents have identical CES utility functions. It is of interest to note that the
efﬁcient equilibrium that they numerically compute is a no-trade equilibrium and that no
particular restriction on the dividend processes are needed to ensure analytical tractability.7This suggestion was studied further by Serrat (2001) who considered a continuous-time model with two
countries, two traded goods, two stocks and one non-traded good in each country.
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exists if and only if utility functions are cardinally identical across agents. Kollmann (2006)
provides a discussion on the volume of trade obtained by considering agents with different
elasticity of substitution.6. Extensions
As demonstrated in Section 4.2, an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium can exist even if the
agents do not have identical preferences. Given this result, one naturally wonders what
other sources of heterogeneity could generate nontrivial equilibrium trading volume. In
order to partially answer this question, we now brieﬂy discuss two extensions of the basic
model: one incorporating heterogeneous beliefs and one where the agents receive random
ﬂows of endowments through time.
To accommodate such extensions of the model we assume throughout this section that
there are multiple goods but only one traded security per good. This is sufﬁcient to
illustrate that no-trade equilibria are generically not robust to the introduction of
heterogenous beliefs or to the addition of other income.6.1. Heterogeneous beliefs
Throughout the paper we have maintained the assumption that agents differ only
through their utility functions and initial portfolios. In particular, we have assumed that
the two agents share the same beliefs. Standard economic intuition suggests that
heterogeneity in beliefs is likely to increase exchanges among agents. To clarify this point,
assume that agent i’s beliefs are fully described by the density process Zi of his subjective
probability measure Pi relative to P and that his preferences are represented by a time
additive expected utility functional
UiðcÞ :¼Ei
Z T
0
uiðt; ctÞdt
 
¼ E
Z T
0
Zituiðt; ctÞdt
 
, (51)
where Ei is the expectation operator under Pi. Now assume that there exists an efﬁcient no-
trade equilibrium. In any such equilibrium, the Pareto optimality of the consumption
allocations and the necessity of linear sharing rules for no trade, imply that
ru1ðt;wdtÞZ1t ¼ lru2ðt; dt  wdtÞZ2t (52)
holds almost everywhere for some strictly positive constant l and diagonal matrix w with
strictly positive, constant diagonal elements wao1. For this relation to hold, the
divergence in beliefs must exactly compensate the potential divergence in marginal utilities.
While it might be possible to construct such beliefs structures, they are non-generic and
their economic relevance seems doubtful.88Pavlova and Rigobon (2003) consider an economy with multiple goods, log-linear preferences, and
heterogeneous beliefs. For this economy, they show the existence of a complete market equilibrium in which
the optimal portfolio strategies are buy-and-hold. The associated consumption shares, which depend on the
divergence in beliefs, are stochastic and time varying. Therefore, the implementation of the equilibrium allocation
requires continuous trading in the spot market for goods.
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Let us now assume that, in addition to an initial portfolio of the traded securities, agents
receive a random ﬂow of endowment in each of the available goods. Denote by eai the rate
at which agent i receives his endowment in good a and assume that the corresponding
vector of good-speciﬁc endowments is a bounded Itoˆ process of the form
eait ¼ eai0 þ
Z t
0
ðBais dsþ ðtaisÞ> dBsÞ (53)
for some exogenously given drift process Bi and volatility matrix ti. In such a setting, a
consumption plan is said to be feasible for agent i if there exists an admissible trading
strategy y which implies a wealth process that satisﬁes the dynamic budget constraint
W 0 ¼ y00 þ
X
a2A
ya0S
a
0 ¼Wi0 :¼
X
a2A
nai S
a
0, ð54Þ
dWt ¼ y0t dS0t þ
X
a2A
ðyat ðdSat þ pat Dat dtÞ  pat ðcat  eat ÞdtÞ, ð55Þ
with a nonnegative terminal value. In the following corollary we provide necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of a no-trade equilibrium for the above continuous-
time economy with random endowments. We state the results without proof, as they are
simply obtained by replacing cai by c
a
i  eai in the proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary 5. The following assertions are equivalent:1. There exists an efficient no-trade equilibrium.
2. There exists an efficient equilibrium in which the individual consumption policies satisfy
cait  eait
cai0  eai0
¼ D
a
t
Da0
; i 2 f1; 2g, (56)
where Da is the dividend process associated with the only security paying out in good
a 2A.
3. There exists a diagonal matrix f with strictly positive, constant diagonal elements ðfaÞa2A
such that
ru1ðt;fDt þ e1tÞ
r1u1ð0;fD0 þ e10Þ
¼ ru2ðt;Dt  fDt þ e2tÞr1u2ð0;D0  fD0 þ e20Þ
, (57)
and
E
Z T
0
ru1ðt;fDt þ e1tÞ>ððf Fðna1ÞÞDt  e1tÞdt
 
¼ 0, (58)
where D denotes the vector of good-specific dividend processes and F is the linear operator
defined in Section 3.1.
Note that it is always possible to construct the agents’ endowment processes in such a
way that, given the other primitives of the economy, there exists an efﬁcient no-trade
equilibrium. An example of such a construction, albeit in a slightly different setup, can be
found in Constantinides and Dufﬁe (1996). However, and as already observed for peculiar
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generally lie in a set of measure zero.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate under what conditions non-informational heterogeneity
among agents leads to positive trading volume in equilibrium. We provide necessary and
sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium in a continuous-
time economy with multiple goods, multiple securities, symmetric information, and
homogeneous beliefs. We illustrate our results with numerous examples that include most
of the classic multi-good utility functions. Relations with linear sharing rules, fund
separation, autarky, and portfolio autarky equilibria are also addressed.
No-trade equilibria are computationally tractable and thus attractive for future
empirical studies of the connections between ﬁnancial markets, exchange rates, and spot
markets for goods. In contrast to portfolio autarky equilibria they cannot necessarily be
implemented by trades only in the spot market of consumption goods. Financial markets
are non-redundant and, contrary to peculiar ﬁnancial market equilibria, asset volatilities
are non-degenerate in general. If extended to an overlapping generation setting where one
cohort of investors is always in their initial period, these equilibria can potentially be used
to derive tractable efﬁcient equilibria with trade in both the spot market for consumption
goods and the ﬁnancial markets. The study of such a model would overcome some of the
deﬁciencies of the classic international asset pricing models and is left for future research.
AppendixProof of Proposition 1. The ﬁrst assertion follows directly from Theorem 8.5 in Karatzas,
Lehoczky, Shreve, and Xu (1991) after some straightforward modiﬁcations to
accommodate the presence of multiple goods and intermediate consumption.
The second assertion can be established in the same way as Theorem 9.3 of Karatzas,
Lehoczky, Shreve, and Xu (1991) provided that the utility functional can be differentiated
under the integral sign. To guarantee that this is indeed the case we assume that the utility
function satisﬁes the growth condition
lim sup
b!1
sup
c2CðbÞ
c>rauiðt; cÞ
uiðt; cÞ
o1; ða; tÞ 2A ½0;T , (59)
where CðbÞ denotes the set of nonnegative vectors whose lowest coordinate is larger than
the nonnegative constant b. This condition is referred to as reasonable asymptotic elasticity
and has proved crucial in the resolution of incomplete markets portfolio and consumption
choice problems; see Kramkov and Schachermayer (1999) for the single-good case and
Kamizono (2001) for the multi-good case. &
Characterization of efficient equilibria. All there is to prove is that for each consumption
good a 2A the local martingale Na deﬁned in (23) is a martingale. To this end, we start by
observing that the wealth process of agent i along the equilibrium path is given by
Wit :¼E
Z T
t
xsp>s cis ds
xt
Ft
 
, (60)
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expressions over i and using the goods market-clearing conditions, we deduce that the
aggregate wealth in the economy is given by
Mt ¼W 1t þW 2t ¼ E
Z T
t
xsp>s ds ds
xt
Ft
 
(61)
and it follows that the nonnegative process deﬁned by
Qt ¼ xtMt þ
Z t
0
xsp
>
s ds ds (62)
is a martingale of class D under the objective probability measure. Now let a 2A be given
and ﬁx an arbitrary k 2 f1; . . . ; nag. The absence of arbitrage opportunities and the
deﬁnition of the vector of aggregate dividends imply that we have 0pNakpQ. It follows
that the local martingale Nak is of class D, and hence it is a martingale.
Proof of Theorem 1. To establish the implication 1) 2, assume that there exists an
efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium. First note that the optimal holding of the money market
account must be zero. Indeed, as in the absence of arbitrage opportunities SaT ¼ 0na , it
follows from the individual optimality that
0 ¼WiT ¼ y0iTS0T þ
X
a2A
ðyaiT Þ>SaT ¼ y0iTS0T . (63)
Observing that S0T is strictly positive, we conclude that y
0
i0 ¼ y0iT ¼ 0. On the other hand,
applying Itoˆ’s lemma to (6) and using the dynamic budget constraint, we obtain
p>t ðFðbaÞDt  c1tÞ ¼ 0, (64)
where ba :¼ya10 2 ð0; 1Þna . By deﬁnition of a no-trade equilibrium, there is no activity on the
goods markets, so the above identity and the goods market-clearing conditions imply that
the equilibrium consumption policies are linear in the dividends and given by
c1t ¼ FðbaÞDt; c2t ¼ ðI FðbaÞÞDt. (65)
Now, Pareto optimality of the equilibrium consumption allocations implies that the
marginal utilities of the two agents are aligned in the sense that there exists a strictly
positive constant l such that
ru1ðt;FðbaÞDtÞ ¼ lru2ðt; ðI FðbaÞÞDtÞ. (66)
Applying Itoˆ’s lemma to both sides of the above equation and identifying the volatility
coefﬁcients, we obtain that
ðHu1ðt;FðbaÞDtÞFðbaÞ  lHu2ðt; ðI FðbaÞÞDtÞðI FðbaÞÞÞWt ¼ 0 (67)
almost surely for all t 2 ½0;T  where H denotes the Hessian matrix of second derivatives
and W is the volatility matrix of the dividend processes. As the volatility matrix of the
dividend processes has full row rank by assumption, this in turn implies
Hu1ðt;FðbaÞDtÞFðbaÞ ¼ lHu2ðt; ðI FðbaÞÞDtÞðI FðbaÞÞ. (68)
Using the deﬁnition of the mapping F in conjunction with the fact that the above equation
holds almost everywhere, we easily deduce that
W1aba ¼W2a1a; a 2A, (69)
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deﬁnite square matrices deﬁned by
W2 :¼Hu2ð0; ðI FðbaÞÞD0Þ, ð70Þ
W1 :¼Hu1ð0;FðbaÞD0Þ þ lW2. ð71Þ
Using the fact that the agents’ utility functions are strictly concave, we can easily deduce
that the constantsWia satisfyW
1
aoW2ao0 and it follows that we have ba ¼ wa1a for some
strictly positive constant in ð0; 1Þ. Plugging this result back into Eq. (65) gives the condition
in Assertion 2 after some straightforward simpliﬁcations.
To establish the implication 2) 3, assume that there exists an efﬁcient equilibrium
satisfying the conditions of Assertion 2 and let w denote the diagonal matrix with strictly
positive diagonal elements deﬁned by
wa :¼ c
a
10
1>a D
a
0
; a 2A. (72)
Using the Pareto optimality of the equilibrium allocations in conjunction with the assumed
form of the consumption plans, we obtain that there exists a strictly positive constant l
such that
ru1ðt;wdtÞ ¼ lru2ðt; dt  wdtÞ. (73)
Writing the ﬁrst coordinate of this vector identity at time zero allows us to identify the
Negishi weight as
l ¼ r1u1ð0;wd0Þr1u2ð0; d0  wd0Þ
(74)
and plugging this expression back into Eq. (73) gives the ﬁrst condition in Assertion 3. On
the other hand, the assumed form of the equilibrium allocations and the second part of
Proposition 1 imply that
ruiðt; citÞ ¼ yiptxit (75)
for some strictly positive constant yi and some arbitrage-free state price density process
xi :¼xki 2S such that
Wi0 ¼ Fðnai ÞS0 ¼ E
Z T
0
xitp
>
t wdt dt
 
, (76)
where S denotes the n-dimensional column vector obtained by stacking up the good-
speciﬁc securities price vectors ðSaÞa2A. Using (75) in conjunction with the Pareto
optimality of the equilibrium allocations, we deduce that
ptx
1
t ¼ ptx2t ¼
1
y1
ru1ðt;wdtÞ ¼
1
y2
ru2ðt; dt  wdtÞ. (77)
Using the ﬁrst coordinate of the above equation at time zero to identify the constant y1 and
plugging the result into (76) with i ¼ 1 then gives
Fðna1ÞS0 ¼ E
Z T
0
ru1ðt;wdtÞ>wdt
r1u1ð0;wd0Þ
dt
 
. (78)
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function uðt; l; Þ as in Eq. (15) even if the resulting markets are incomplete. Thus, it follows
from the deﬁnition of the representative agent’s marginal utility and the results of Section
3.3 that the equilibrium securities prices satisfy
Sa0 ¼ E
Z T
0
rau1ðs;wdtÞDat
r1u1ð0;wd0Þ
dt
 
. (79)
Plugging this expression back into Eq. (78) and rearranging the terms gives the second
condition in Assertion 3.
In order to establish the implication 3) 1, and thus complete the proof of the theorem,
we have to show that given a matrix w satisfying the conditions of Assertion 3 we can
construct an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium. To this end, consider the trading strategies and
consumption rates deﬁned by
y01t ¼ y02t ¼ 0, ð80Þ
ya1t ¼ wa1a ¼ 1a  ya2t, ð81Þ
ca1t ¼ wadat ¼ wa1>a Dat ¼ dat  ca2t, ð82Þ
and let the securities and relative goods prices be given by
pt :¼
ru1ðt; c1tÞ
r1u1ðt; c1tÞ
¼ ru2ðt; c2tÞr1u2ðt; c2tÞ
, ð83Þ
Sat :¼E
Z T
t
r1u1ðs; c1sÞ
r1u1ðt; c1tÞ
pat D
a
t dt
Ft
 
. ð84Þ
As (i) all markets clear, (ii) there is no trading volume on any of the open markets and (iii)
the marginal utilities of the two agents are aligned, in order to establish that the collection
ðp; fSag; fci; yigÞ constitutes an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium only requires proving that the
consumption allocations are optimal given the securities prices. To this end, let x be the
process deﬁned by
xt :¼
r1u1ðt; c1tÞ
r1u1ð0; c10Þ
¼ r1u2ðt; c2tÞr1u2ð0; c20Þ
X0. (85)
Using the deﬁnition of ci in conjunction with the deﬁnition of the securities prices and the
second condition in Assertion 3, we have
E
Z T
0
xtp
>
t fcit  Fðnai ÞDtgdt
 
¼ 0. (86)
On the other hand, using the fact that for each a 2A the process
xtS
a
t þ
Z t
0
xsp
a
sD
a
s ds (87)
is a martingale, we deduce that the process x belongs to the set S of state price densities
and since ci is feasible by construction, it follows from the second part of Proposition 1
that the consumption plan ci is optimal for agent i. &
Proof of Corollary 1. According to the third assertion of Theorem 1, we have that an
efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium exists if and only if there are strictly positive constants
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a11ðw1D1t Þr1 þ a12ðw2D2t Þr1
a11ðw1D10Þr1 þ a12ðw2D20Þr1
 !g1
r1
1
a21ðð1 w1ÞD1t Þr2 þ a22ðð1 w2ÞD2t Þr2
a21ðð1 w1ÞD10Þr2 þ a22ðð1 w2ÞD20Þr2
 !g2
r2
1 ¼
D1t
Da0
 r2r1
¼ D
2
t
Da0
 r2r1
(88)
and the static budget constraint (27) holds true. Since the dividend processes are linearly
independent by assumption, the above equation holds if and only if r1 ¼ r2 ¼ r and
a11ðw1D1t Þr þ a12ðw2D2t Þr
a11ðw1D10Þr þ a12ðw2D20Þr
 !g1
r1
a21ðð1 w1ÞD1t Þr þ a22ðð1 w2ÞD2t Þr
a21ðð1 w1ÞD10Þr þ a22ðð1 w2ÞD20Þr
 !g2
r1
¼ 1. (89)
Using once again the linear independence of the dividends, we deduce that the above
equation admits a solution if and only if g1 ¼ g2 ¼ g. Using these restrictions in the third
assertion of Theorem 1 yields the following system of equations:
a11
a21
w1
1 w1
 r1
¼
a11ðw1D10Þr1ða11ðw1D10Þr þ a12ðw2D20ÞrÞ
g
r1
a21ðð1 w1ÞD10Þr1ða21ðð1 w2ÞD10Þr þ a22ðð1 w2ÞD20ÞrÞ
g
r1
ða11ðw1D1tÞr þ a12ðw2D2tÞrÞ
g
r1
ða21ðð1 w1ÞD1tÞr þ a22ðð1 w2ÞD2tÞrÞ
g
r1
,
ð90Þ
a12
a22
w2
1 w2
 r1
¼
a11ðw1D10Þr1ða11ðw1D10Þr þ a12ðw2D20ÞrÞ
g
r1
a21ðð1 w1ÞD10Þr1ða21ðð1 w2ÞD10Þr þ a22ðð1 w2ÞD20ÞrÞ
g
r1
ða11ðw1D1tÞr þ a12ðw2D2tÞrÞ
g
r1
ða21ðð1 w1ÞD1tÞr þ a22ðð1 w2ÞD2tÞrÞ
g
r1
.
ð91Þ
Manipulating this system yields the following set of equations:
a11
a21
w1
1 w1
 r1
¼ a12
a22
w2
1 w2
 r1
, ð92Þ
a11
a21
w1
1 w1
 r
¼ a12
a22
w2
1 w2
 r
, ð93Þ
which admits a solution if and only if
a11
a12
¼ a21
a22
, (94)
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w1 ¼ gðw2Þ :¼ 1þ 1 w
2
w2
 1
. (95)
Plugging this relation back into the static budget constraint (27), we obtain that an efﬁcient
no-trade equilibrium exists if and only if there exists a strictly positive constant f 2 ð0; 1Þ
such that
hðfÞ :¼E
Z T
0
ru1ðt;GDtÞ>ðG  Fðna1ÞÞDt dt
 
¼ 0, (96)
where G denotes the diagonal matrix with elements gðfÞ and f. Using well-known analytic
arguments, as found for example in Detemple and Serrat (2003), it can be shown that
under our assumptions the function h is continuous on the interval ð0; 1Þ with
hð0þÞ :¼ lim
f!0
hðfÞo0ohð1Þ :¼ lim
f!1
hðfÞ. (97)
This implies the existence of a point f such that hðfÞ ¼ 0 and it follows that there exists an
efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium. &
Proof of Corollary 2. According to the third assertion of Theorem 1, an efﬁcient no-trade
equilibrium exists if and only if there are strictly positive constants wa 2 ð0; 1Þ such that
a11
D1t
D10
 !a11a21
¼ a21
D2t
D20
 !a22a12
, ð98Þ
a12w1
a11w2
D1t
D10
 !a11a21
¼ a22ð1 w
1Þ
a21ð1 w2Þ
D2t
D20
 !a22a12
ð99Þ
and the static budget constraint (27) holds true. Since the dividend processes are linearly
independent by assumption, we can deduce that the above equation holds if and only if
a1a ¼ a2a and thus w1 ¼ w2 ¼ w. The static budget constraint (27) then gives
a11ðw n11Þ þ a12ðw n21Þ
w
¼ 0. (100)
Solving this linear equation, we conclude that
w ¼ a11n
1
1 þ a12n21
a11 þ a12
. (101)
As na1 2 ð0; 1Þ we have by assumption that w 2 ð0; 1Þ, and thus, it follows that an efﬁcient
no-trade equilibrium exists. &
Proof of Corollary 3. Using the equivalent assertions of Theorem 1 and the log-linear
structure of the utility functions, we deduce that an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium exists if
and only if the two-dimensional system
1þ a12a21
a11a22
1 w2
w2
  1
¼ w1, ð102Þ
a11
w1  n11
w1
þ a12
w2  n21
w2
¼ 0, ð103Þ
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plugging the result into the second equation, we obtain that the above system admits a
unique solution, which is explicitly given by
w1 ¼ a11ða21n
1
1 þ a22n21Þ
a12a21ð1 n21Þ þ a11ða21 þ a22n21Þ
, ð104Þ
w2 ¼ a12ða21n
1
1 þ a22n21Þ
a11a22ð1 n11Þ þ a12ða22 þ a21n11Þ
. ð105Þ
As na1 2 ð0; 1Þ by assumption, we obtain that this solution lies in ð0; 1Þ2 and it follows that
an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium exists. &
Proof of Corollary 4. According to the third assertion of Theorem 1, we have that there
exists an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium if and only if there are strictly positive constants
wa 2 ð0; 1Þ such that
ðD1t Þa11a21 ¼ ðD10Þa11a21 , ð106Þ
ðw2D2t Þa121
ðð1 w2ÞD2t Þa221
¼ ðw
1D1t Þa111
ðð1 w1ÞD1t Þa211
, ð107Þ
and the static budget constraint (27) holds. Since the dividend processes are stochastic and
linearly independent, the above equations admit a solution if and only if a1a ¼ a2a.
Assuming that this is the case and solving the second equation for the nonnegative
constant w1, we ﬁnd
w1 ¼ gðw2Þ :¼ 1þ 1 w
2
w2
 a121
a111
0
@
1
A
1
. (108)
Plugging this relation back into the static budget constraint of agent 1 and invoking an
argument similar to that used in the proof of Corollary 1 then gives the existence of an
efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium. &
The following easy lemma provides a characterization of the class of unit-elastic utility
functions and will be useful in the proof of Proposition 2.
Lemma 1. Assume that there are two consumption goods so that A ¼ 2. Then the utility
function vi has unit elasticity of substitution if and only if
viðcÞ ¼ Fiðc2ðc
1
mi
1 ÞÞ (109)
for some constant mi 2 ð0;1Þ and some strictly increasing, strictly concave, and continuously
differentiable function Fi that satisfies the Inada conditions.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume that there exists an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium which is
not an autarky equilibrium and denote by
c1t ¼
w1D1t
w2D2t
 !
(110)
the optimal consumption of the ﬁrst agent. As is easily seen from the deﬁnition, it is
possible to implement this consumption allocation in portfolio autarky if and only if the
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ðw1  n11ÞD1t þ ðw2  n12Þp2t D2t ¼ 0, (111)
where na1 denotes the initial portfolio of the ﬁrst agent. This is in turn equivalent to the fact
that the equilibrium spot price is given by
p2t ¼
w1  n11
n12  w2
D1t
D2t
 !
¼ m D
1
t
D2t
 !
. (112)
In order to complete the ﬁrst part the proof, we need to show that this condition is
equivalent to that of unit-elastic utility functions. To this end, assume that Eq. (112) holds.
Since the equilibrium allocation is efﬁcient, we have
r2v1ðw1D1t ;w2D2t Þ
r1v1ðw1D1t ;w2D2t Þ
¼ r2v2ðð1 w
1ÞD1t ; ð1 w2ÞD2t Þ
r1v2ðð1 w1ÞD1t ; ð1 w2ÞD2t Þ
¼ mD
1
t
D2t
. (113)
These equations and the fact that the dividend processes are unbounded imply that the
agents’ utility functions satisfy
r2viðcÞ
r1viðcÞ
¼ mi
c1
c2
; c 2 ð0;1Þ2, (114)
for some strictly positive constants mi. Solving this differential equation shows that the iso-
utility curves of the utility functions are given by c2 ¼ Biðc1Þ1=mi for some nonnegative
constants Bi and it follows that
viðcÞ ¼ við1; c2ððc1Þ
1
mi ÞÞ. (115)
In particular, the utility functions satisfy the conditions of Lemma 1 with the functions
FiðxÞ ¼ við1;xÞ and hence have unit elasticity of substitution.
Conversely, assume that the utility function ui satisﬁes Eq. (109) for some ðmi;FiÞ such
that an efﬁcient no-trade equilibrium exists and let the optimal consumption of the ﬁrst
agent be given by Eq. (110). Since the allocation is efﬁcient we have that the relative price
process is given by
p2t ¼ m1
w1D1t
w2D2t
¼ m2
ð1 w1ÞD1t
ð1 w2ÞD2t
. (116)
Plugging this back into the static budget constraint (27) and using the deﬁnition of the
agent’s consumption allocation, we obtain
m1
w1
w2
¼ w
1  n11
n12  w2
. (117)
In particular, Eq. (112) holds and it follows that the efﬁcient allocation can be
implemented in portfolio autarky.
To complete the proof, we now need to show that for unit-elastic preferences, one of the
stocks is redundant. This easily follows from the expression of the equilibrium stock prices
and Eq. (112). &
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